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Ethnicity in the Cosmopolitan Imaginary1 
 
Craig Calhoun 
 
 In the 1990s, much discourse both in and about global civil society was beset by a 
false opposition. On the one side was the utopia of cosmopolitan liberalism. On the other 
side was the specter of reactionary nationalism or fundamentalism. And of course in a 
variety of settings, some national and some diasporically transnational, the value loading 
was reversed: fundamentalist or national utopia, threatening specter of cosmopolitan 
liberalism.  
 September 11th and the ensuing conflicts and upheavals refocused the discussion, 
but did not altogether dislodge the false opposition. They gave renewed emphasis to the 
image of Islam as the bad other to liberalism and progress. They encouraged the US 
government to demonize Islam and indeed to extend the condemnation to a secular (if 
extraordinarily ill-governed) Arab state. Commentators reconfigured the false opposition 
in the contrast of the alleged medieval character of the Taliban to the more modern West. 
Leaders who had not previously shown any strong interest in gender equality embraced it 
when it worked to reinforce the contrast. Not only such human rights issues but a variety 
of other indicators were harnessed to show the lack of ‘progress’ in Islamic societies, 
including even the sheer high-tech military prowess of America. The language of liberal 
democracy was invoked to explain the need for externally imposed regime change in Iraq 
(and possibly other Islamic societies). But at the same time, the 9/11 attacks and the 
dominant Western responses to them upset the cosmopolitan vision of an easy, happy 
progress towards cosmopolitan democracy. The US government’s post 9/11 policies 
undermined multilateralism; security policies of many countries impeded flows of 
international visitors and migrants; already growing economic problems and protectionist 
impulses were exacerbated.  
 The prospects for cosmopolitan democracy and the more general discourse of 
liberal internationalism of which it is a part look less promising today than they did in the 
1990s. But the basic rhetorical opposition between the liberal cosmopolitan and the 
illiberal local remains influential. It is not only misleading, but part of an ideological 
tendency to misrecognize the character of globalization and the conditions of liberal 
discourse within it. The opposition implies that its two terms operate separately from the 
shaping of the global order by capitalist economic relations (and others, like flows of 
loans and aid). It encourages a substitution of ethics for politics, accounts of what is good 
or bad in individual action for how collective struggles might change social structure or 
institutions. And it permits at most a thin appreciation of the sociological character of 
membership or belonging, including changes in belonging and efforts to transcend 
particular solidarities.  
 The present paper focuses on the way in which social solidarity—and its 
individual manifestation in a sense of belonging in specific cultural and social settings—
is marginalized and often stigmatized in the asocial imaginary characteristic of the new 
self-declared cosmopolitan variants of liberalism. In particular, I ask whether there is any 
place for culture or ethnicity in such theory except as the stigmatized other, more or less 
                                                 
1 Forthcoming in Ethnicities. I am grateful for comments in March 2003 from audiences at the East-West 
Center, University of Hawaii and University of California, Berkeley, Department of Sociology. 
tolerated. Put otherwise, can cosmopolitan theory value humanity not merely in the 
abstract but in the concrete variety of its ways of life? I argue that cosmopolitan liberals 
often fail to recognize the social conditions of their own discourse, presenting it as 
freedom from social belonging rather than a special sort of belonging, a view from 
nowhere or everywhere rather from particular social spaces. The views of cosmopolitan 
elites express privilege; they are not neutral apprehensions of the whole. I argue also that 
an approach that starts with individuals and treats culture as contingent cannot do justice 
to the legitimate claims made on behalf of “communities,” and the reasons why “thick 
attachments” to particular solidarities still matter—whether in the forms of nations, 
ethnicities, local communities, or religions.  
Cosmopolitanism need not be presented as the universalistic enemy of particular 
solidarities, but it often is. I will concentrate here on the theories for which this is most 
true. Because of their sociological deficiencies, despite their good insights these theories 
fail to make sense of the world as it is and the next steps people might take to make both 
it and their lives better. Indeed, they offer an abstract normative structure which, however 
much occasioned by real-world social change, can only have the standing of “abstract 
ought” with all the potential tyranny over the immanent projects of social improvement 
that implies. They both underestimate and potentially undermine the gains made in 
spanning important lines of difference precisely by developing new solidarities. 
Ironically, these gains suggest better than abstract universalism how cosmopolitan (in its 
best senses) could grow.  
Cosmopolitanism, Liberalism, and Belonging 
Liberalism has grown up in close relationship to the modern state. Ideas of 
citizenship and rights both reflect the attempt to construct the proper relationship between 
individual subject and sovereign state. Liberals often rely at least tacitly on the idea of 
“nation” to give an account of why particular people belonged together as the “people” of 
a particular state. But for the most part, liberal theory has not focused on the sources or 
nature of solidarity, but rather the relationship of individuals to states mediated by 
citizenship. So long as the fiction of a perfect match between nations and states was 
plausible, this was relatively unproblematic, though it meant liberal theory was 
sociologically impoverished (despite repeated efforts to integrate more attention to 
participation and difference, both in part issues of social solidarity). 
Problems did arise with both the system of nation-states and the political theory of 
liberal democracy. Wars and refugees, for example, posed recurrent challenges. As 
Hannah Arendt (1951) emphasized, Jews and others were denied citizenship by both the 
Nazi Germany from which they escaped and the other countries into which they fled. 
That ideas of individual rights could not protect them revealed the extent to which rights 
were really reflections of state power (and only limits on such power for those accorded 
legitimate membership). After the war, a variety of efforts were made to provide better 
for stateless people, including signing a variety of treaties and founding such 
organizations as the United Nations High Commission for Refugees. Nonetheless, states 
were the signatories on the treaties and states formed the UN and the high commission. 
Even though ideas of human rights would become increasingly important, especially after 
the Cold War, they did not escape the issue of state sovereignty.  
Capitalism too has posed challenges to political liberalism, even though the idea 
of the property-owning individual has been closely bound up with that of the autonomous 
political subject. Free-market individualism has produced a libertarian (and sometimes 
liberal) resistance to state power, but still treats state and individual as the fundamental 
units of analysis. At the same time, capitalism has produced a substantial arena of 
economic power that demands autonomy from not only states but liberal conceptions of 
participatory rights and democracy. Not least of all, though the growth of markets and 
capitalist firms often depended on systems of state support, capitalist economic relations 
transcended states. Capitalism produced global organization of production and global 
flows of goods and indeed people that states could not effectively control.   
During the 1990s, these challenges intensified. A variety of humanitarian crises, 
often products of civil wars and ethnic conflicts, pressed human rights issues to the fore 
and linked them in complicated ways to notions of intervention by an “international 
community” into the ostensibly sovereign affairs of states. The (somewhat nebulously 
conceived) international community itself included a growing range of nonstate 
organizations, but interventions, especially military ones, generally reflected state power 
even when they were organized through multilateral organizations. At the same time, 
capitalist globalization grew enormously.  
Faced with these challenges, many liberals began an important effort to rethink 
liberal theory. John Rawls, the most important liberal theorist of our era, had for example 
produced a monumentally influential theory of justice that presumed an individual state 
as the necessary context of analysis (1971). A well-ordered society, he insisted, was 
precisely not a community or an association: 
…we have assumed that a democratic society, like any political society, is to be 
viewed as a complete and closed social system. It is complete in that it is self-
sufficient and has a place for all the main purposes of human life. It is also closed, 
in that entry into it is only by birth and exit from it is only by death.(Rawls 1993: 
41) 
Rawls intentionally postponed analysis of relations among states and transnational 
phenomena to a later step in analysis. In recent years, however, this prioritization of the 
individual society came to seem increasingly untenable. It began to seem fundamental  
and not contingent that markets and other social relations extend across nation-state 
borders, that migration and cultural flows challenge nationalist notions of the integral 
character of cultures and political communities, that states are not able to organize or 
control many of the main influences on the lives of their citizens, and that the most 
salient inequalities are intersocietally global and thus not addressed by intrasocietal 
measures. Accordingly, an important project for liberals was to work out how to extend 
their theories of justice and political legitimacy to a global scale. Rawls’ (1999) own 
approach was to retain the notion of “peoples” or discrete societies, and then to propose a 
“law of peoples” regulating relations among these. Liberal cosmopolitans generally do 
the opposite, extending “domestic” criteria of justice to the scale of humanity as a 
whole.2  
                                                 
2 The cosmopolitans build on an important line of criticism of Rawls’ theory of justice which focused on 
its limitation to single societies. Many critics favored eliminating the notion of “a society” smaller than the 
population of the globe and simply trying to rewrite the theory on this new scale. Among the first to argue 
thus was Charles Beitz (1979). Rawls (1999) did not accept this approach because he held that in any 
foreseeable near term future there would be distinct societies, and thus the more universal theory would be 
Many of the most important leaders in these efforts to rethink liberalism adopted 
the notion of “cosmopolitanism” as a frame.3 This draws on classical and early modern 
sources for a moral vision in which all humanity is equally valued. Cosmopolitanism is 
presented not only as a timeless good but as a specific response to current historical 
circumstances. The extension of markets, media, and migration has, advocates of a new 
cosmopolitan liberalism argue, reduced both the efficacy of states and the adequacy of 
moral and political analysis that approaches one “society” at a time. At the same time, 
“identity politics” and multiculturalism have in the eyes of many liberals been excessive 
and become sources of domestic divisions and illiberal appeals to special rights for 
different groups. Accordingly, cosmopolitan theorists argue that the “first principles” of 
ethical obligation and political community should stress the allegiance of each to all at 
the scale of humanity.  
 The new cosmopolitans retain, however, one of the weaknesses of older forms of 
liberalism. They offer no strong account of social solidarity or of the role of culture in 
constituting human life. For the most part, they start theorizing from putatively 
autonomous, discrete, and cultureless individuals. Reliance on the assumption that 
nations were naturally given pre-political bases for states had helped older liberals to 
paper over the difficulty of explaining why the individuals of their theories belonged in 
particular states (or conversely could rightly be excluded from them). The new 
cosmopolitanism is generally antinationalist, seeing nations as part of the fading order of 
political life divided on lines of states. They rightly refuse to rely on this tacit 
nationalism. But as they offer no new account of solidarity save the obligations of each 
human being to all others, they give little weight to “belonging,” to the notion that social 
relationships might be as basic as individuals, or that individuals exist only in cultural 
milieux—even if usually in several at the same time. 
 Indeed, much of the new liberal cosmopolitan thought proceeds as though 
belonging is a matter of social constraints from which individuals ideally ought to escape, 
or temptations to favoritism they ought to resist. Claims of special loyalty or 
responsibility to nations, communities, or ethnic groups, thus, are subordinated or fall 
under suspicion of illegitimacy. To claim that one’s self-definition, even ones specific 
version of loyalty to humanity, comes through membership of some such more particular 
solidarity is, in Martha Nussbaum’s (1996: 5) words, a “morally questionable move of 
self-definition by a morally irrelevant characteristic.”   
The individualism the new cosmopolitanism inherits from earlier liberalism is 
attractive partly because of its emphasis on freedom, and this encourages suspicion of 
arguments in favor of ethnicity, communities, or nations. These, many suggest, can be 
legitimate only as the choices of free individuals—and to the extent they are inherited 
rather than chosen they should be scrutinized carefully, denied any privileged standing, 
and possibly rejected. Against suggestions that individuals derive their identity from such 
solidarities, and thus have just reasons to defend them, Rogers Brubaker and Frederick 
Cooper (2000) have argued that it is a mistake to speak at all of identity in this sense. 
Rather, they suggest, we should treat individuals as primary and speak of their 
                                                                                                                                                 
unrealistic enough to lack purchase on the problems of regulating their legitimate relations with each other. 
For this a “law of peoples” was needed.   
3 Anthologies representing diverse approaches include Archibugi and Held (1995); Archibugi, Held, and 
Kohler (1999); Archibugi (2003); Cheah and Robbins (1998); and Vertovec and Cohen (2003). 
“identifications”. Brubaker and Cooper offer important criticism of both overly fixed 
(and often simplistic) claims for “identity” and a thoroughgoing constructivism that 
essentially dissolves into relativism. To speak only of identifications, however, implies 
that individual persons are real in a sense in which groups and social relationships are 
not. It is only a short step to Jeremy Bentham’s (1789: 13) famous injunction that “the 
community is a fictitious body composed of the individual persons who are considered as 
constituting as it were its members. The interest of the community then is, what?—the 
sum of the interests of the several members who compose it”. And from Bentham, of 
course, it is only another short step to Margaret Thatcher’s famous assertion that “society 
does not exist” (which she backed up by attacking a great many social institutions). 
 At least in their extreme forms, cosmopolitanism and individualism participate in 
this pervasive tendency to deny the reality of the social. Their combination represents an 
attempt to get rid of ‘society’ as a feature of political theory. It is part of the odd 
coincidence since the 1960s of left wing and right wing attacks on the state. This has 
made it harder to defend welfare states (let alone socialism) and harder to resist 
neoliberalism in both domestic and international policies. Hayekians and postmodernists 
have led the way in this denigration of the social, seeing it as restrictive and potentially 
authoritarian. Mainstream liberalism has followed suit partly because it had grasped the 
social overwhelmingly as the national. It conflated society with nation in order to posit 
the prepolitical basis for social order, the ‘people’ to whom a democratic government 
must respond in order to be legitimate. But when the national seemed fundamentally 
illegitimate, as it did to many liberals in the 1990s, the theory offered little other 
approach to social solidarity. 
 Nonetheless, it is impossible not to belong to social groups, relations, or culture. 
The idea of individuals abstract enough to be able to choose all their “identifications” is 
deeply misleading. Versions of this idea are, however, widespread in liberal 
cosmopolitanism. They reflect the attractive illusion of escaping from social 
determinations into a realm of greater freedom, and of cultural partiality into greater 
universalism. But they are remarkably unrealistic, and so abstract as to provide little 
purchase on what the next steps of actual social action might be for real people who are 
necessarily situated in particular webs of belonging, with access to particular others but 
not to humanity in general. Treating ethnicity as essentially a choice of identifications, 
they neglect the omnipresence of ascription (and discrimination) as determinations of 
social identities. And they neglect the extent to which people are implicated in social 
actions which they are not entirely free to choose (as, for example, not liking Bush or 
Cheney, or the idea of invading Iraq does not get one out of being an American). Whether 
blame or benefit follow from such implications, they are not altogether optional. 
Moreover, when the limits of belonging to specific webs of relationships are 
transcended, this is not into a freedom from relationships but into a different organization 
of relationships. If feuding Hatfields and McCoys (or Nuer and Dinka) reorganize to deal 
with their collective enemies or new opportunities, this is not a matter of escaping social 
solidarity but of changing it. Paradigmatically, this is what the growth of nationalism did 
with regard to more local or sectional solidarities (village, province, caste, class, or tribe). 
Nations usually worked by presenting more encompassing identities into which various 
sectional ones could fit. But sometimes transcendence of particular solidarities involves 
no neat larger whole but a patchwork quilt of new connections.  
Identities and solidarities, thus, are neither simply fixed nor simply fluid, but may 
be more fixed or more fluid under different circumstances. It is certainly true that many 
solidarities—and not least of all ethnic ones—have been produced partly to engage in 
new conflicts, not simply to foster a larger peace. It would be a mistake, however, to 
think that this is the only work that ethnicity or community do for people. They provide 
networks of mutual support, capacities for communication, frameworks of meaning. 
Crucially, differential resources give people differential capacities to reach beyond 
particular belongings to other social connections—including very broad ones like nations, 
civilizations, or humanity as a whole. Not only options but needs for solidarities are 
unequally distributed. And as I shall argue, the idea of escaping from particularistic 
solidarities into greater universality may look very different for elites and for those with 
fewer resources. 
The Varieties of Cosmopolitanism 
 Appeals to the idea of cosmopolitanism have been advanced in the context of 
different theoretical and empirical projects, and take on different meanings in each. 
Different articulations overlap, however, and to some extent the common term is a source 
of reinforcement as well as fuzziness.  
In all cases the term has a normative aspect; sometimes this is focused more at the 
level of ethics and sometimes more at that of politics. The most purely normative uses 
tend to be the most abstractly universalistic and rationalistic as well as the most 
decontextualized. Some other uses are more empirical, and offer more openness to 
concrete forms of social belonging, take cultural differences more seriously, and 
sometimes take up cosmopolitanism as a social psychological variable. I am most 
concerned with the problems of the abstractly normative cosmopolitanisms, and will 
concentrate on two of these—or what might be described as extreme and moderate 
variants. More briefly, I will describe appeals to cosmopolitanism that give it more 
empirical content and stress particularity, hybridity, and social-psychological openness to 
difference. The latter are vulnerable to only some of the criticism I will direct to the 
former—notably to the charge of elitism. They also suggest some of the ways in which a 
more satisfactory cosmopolitanism might be developed, one which would complement 
not oppose solidarity. 
The first and most radically universalistic approach to cosmopolitanism starts 
with the ethical obligations of individuals. Many cosmopolitans thus argue that the 
highest and strongest obligation of each person is owed to humanity as a whole. This is 
the position of Martha Nussbaum (1996, 1997). She would recognize other attachments, 
even strong ones, such as those between particular parents and their own children. But 
she would recognize and value them only on the grounds that this particularism is the 
best way to meet the requirements of universal good (1996: 13, 135-6). In other words, it 
is right for parents to care most for their own children, but only because this will ensure 
the best possible global childcare arrangements.  
Nussbaum roots her idea of cosmopolitanism in Stoic thought, and especially 
Diogenes Laertius and others of the often wandering Stoics of the late Roman Empire 
who sought to be citizens of the world rather than of any place in particular, and to defy 
all sorts of social norms. She is willing to accept that it is a “lonely business” and even an 
“exile” from “the comfort of local truths, from the warm, nestling feeling of patriotism” 
(1996: 15). It involves forsaking the “props of habit and local boundaries”. As the 
imagery suggests, Nussbaum presents the cosmopolitan not only as a deracinated 
individual but as one who must demonstrate personal strength to achieve this, a kind of 
virtuoso performance of freedom. Though she sees in this a basis for a better world, one 
in which human rights would be respected and developmental goals advanced, her 
examples of it tend more to emphasize personal life and individuals breaking free from 
the restrictions of social norms.4 At its best, this involves a self-examination in which the 
point of view of the other helps us to grasp the nonessential character of that we might 
otherwise think universal and necessary. But in her accounts, the ‘other’ is sharply 
universal, not herself an embodiment of distinctive culture and belonging. I have argued 
elsewhere that there is a tendency in this sort of cosmopolitan theory to substitute ethics 
for politics, demands for individuals to recognize obligations for analysis of institutional 
conditions that join them in solidarities and oppositions (Calhoun 2002).5 
 Samuel Scheffler has called this extreme cosmopolitanism. Typified by 
Nussbaum, this takes world citizenship as fundamental, clearly and always morally 
superior to more local bonds—such as ethnic or national solidarities--which are good 
when they serve the universal good and tolerable only when they do not conflict with 
world citizenship. The more moderate alternative “is to say that, in addition one’s 
relationships and affiliations with particular individuals and groups, one also stands in an 
ethically significant relation to other human beings in general” (Scheffler 2001: 115). 
David Held is a good exemplar of moderate cosmopolitanism since he stresses more 
clearly than most the importance of multiple and overlapping allegiances of different 
scales.  
This second approach starts with rights rather than obligations, and holds that 
wherever people are joined in significant social relations they have a collective right to 
share in control of these. It is rooted more in democratic theory and less in individual 
ethics. Thus advocates of this view argue that there ought to be a democratic polity to 
administer affairs at every level at which people are connected to each other. This 
underwrites the appeal to cosmopolitan democracy that David Held has laid out most 
forcefully. “People would come, thus, to enjoy multiple citizenships—political 
membership in the diverse political communities which significantly affect them. They 
would be citizens of their immediate political communities, and of the wider regional and 
global networks which impacted upon their lives” (Held 1995: 233). Held’s approach is 
moderate, among other ways, because he doesn’t suggest that people necessarily put the 
                                                 
4 Nussbaum (1996: 16-17) likes the example of Hipparchia and Crates. Theirs was a very philosophical 
romance because, as she quotes Diogenes’ account, Hipparchia “fell in love with Crates’ arguments” rather 
than his wealth, pedigree, or looks. In any case, she forsook the privileged family and class into which she 
had been born and joined him in a life without possessions, but not without its more or less universally 
available entertainments: “they copulated in public and they went off together to dinner parties.” The point 
seems to be that cosmopolitanism can be fun. It is not entirely clear how to elevate it to the level of 
international politics. 
5 A number of self-declared cosmopolitans would qualify or dissent from Nussbaum’s strongest claims. 
For examples of some of these less extreme cosmopolitan positions, see the other contributions to For Love 
of Country, and to the 1994 Boston Review symposium in which Nussbaum’s paper first appeared.  
universal ahead of the particular in all cases, nor does he conceive of cosmopolitanism as 
a form of deracination, of freedom from cultural particularity.6  
In a sense, Nussbaum argues that there should be a prepolitical, moral basis for 
politics—but this should rest not on the alleged priority of ethnic, national or other 
specific loyalties but on the general loyalty of each person to all humanity. Held, by 
contrast, holds that there are no pre-political moral bases for politics, and offers an 
intrinsically political theory, advancing cosmopolitanism as an alternative way of 
establishing the appropriate units of democratic government. It is still a theory of what is 
right, however, rather than of how people might pursue the right, or of how they come to 
be who they are in their different groups. 
 These two kinds of arguments are what I want mainly to consider here, but at the 
outset we should distinguish them from two other ideas of cosmopolitanism. In each case, 
the connections among the different usages inform the connotations of the term, but this 
is sometimes misleading. For example, one important sense of cosmopolitanism is to be 
at ease with strangers and in unfamiliar surroundings. It is a socio-psychological usage 
associated especially with urban life, rather than political organization. Richard Sennett 
evokes this sense in his accounts of 18th and 19th century cities (and corresponding 
critiques of 20th century suburbs). He cites a French usage of 1738: “a cosmopolite … is a 
man who moves comfortably in diversity; he is comfortable in situations which have no 
links or parallels to what is familiar to him” (Sennett 1977: 17). This connotation of the 
term implies that cosmopolitanism involves an appreciation of diversity, not just in the 
sense of toleration for the peaceful co-existence of separate spheres, but as a fact of 
common spaces within which one “moves”. It is not obvious that this is altogether 
compatible with Nussbaum’s strong universalist appeal. At most Nussbaum’s view would 
seem to imply toleration for diversity so long as it did not interfere with a primary 
commitment to equality. Equally, Nussbaum does not seriously confront the possibility 
that cultural diversity involves necessary and deep differences in understandings of the 
good, or human rights, which make the imposition of one vision of the good problematic.  
Still other scholars who claim the term “cosmopolitan” not for any singular 
overarching view of the good, or of universal norms, but for the coexistence and mutual 
influence of multiple cultural influences and values. Homi Bhabha’s calls for hybridity, 
thus, or Salman Rushdie’s argument for the importance of impurity, mixture, and novelty 
rather than appeals to purity exemplify this sense of the cosmopolitan. As Rushdie (1991: 
394) writes, “Melange, hotchpotch, a bit of this and a bit of that is how newness enters 
the world.” Or in the phase of Pollock, Bhabha, Breckenridge, and Chakrabarty (2000: 
580), “Cosmopolitanism, in its wide and wavering nets, catches something of our need to 
ground our sense of mutuality in conditions of mutability, and to learn to live tenaciously 
in terrains of historic and cultural transition.” The emphasis here is cultural rather than 
socio-psychological. It is focused more on creative bricolage than on the flaneur as 
observer of urban difference. But in any case, the cosmopolitanism they evoke is not the 
universalism of Nussbaum, but an infinitude of potential weavings together of more or 
and less local traditions, cultural productivity that seeks to transcend particular traditions 
                                                 
6 To be sure, many cosmopolitans who accept the value of Held’s notion of multiple and overlapping (and 
therefore limited) sovereignty, would place greater stress on the practical difficulties of achieving such a 
complex political order (see the various contributions to Archibugi and Held, 1995). This is a different 
question, though it may limit the purchase of the theory in actual processes of political change. 
and practices that seek to express traditions but not only to themselves. Necessarily, then, 
there is not a singular cosmopolitanism adequate to the world as a whole—nor even any 
fixity of humanity as a whole—but rather a plurality of cosmopolitanisms. Likewise, it is 
not enough simply to contrast vernacular to cosmopolitan, the local tradition of small 
places to the larger traditions of broader spaces. It is crucial to see that these constitute 
each other. There is a “dialectic between cosmopolitan and vernacular that creates them 
both” (Pollock 2000: 616). 
 Each of these third and fourth notions of cosmopolitanism starts from the premise 
of diversity. For the third, that of the urbanite at ease with difference and strangeness, 
diversity is in fact the core value. The paradigmatic urban flaneur could also be a tourist, 
a reader of heterogeneous literatures, or an habitué of exotic foods, languages, or spiritual 
experiences. The point is his openness, and the strength of individual personality he 
manifests in (and indeed acquires from) his relations to such plural contexts.7 This does 
not depend on his membership in any specific culture, nor does it focus attention on the 
mixture of cultural traditions. The fourth sense of cosmopolitanism does both. It presents 
diasporas, the interplay of oral and literate traditions, the relations among village, nation, 
and transnational society as matters of multiple memberships and mixture. It is more fully 
focused on participation than the third, less constituted by observation. Alone of the four 
versions of cosmopolitanism it incorporates, rather than only tolerating, ethnicity. To be 
sure, it does not incorporate the illusory claims of many advocates of ethnicity (as of 
nationalism) to discern a pure core to ethnic culture or precise boundaries to the ethnic 
community. But it understands participation in cosmopolitan relations as participation in 
specific cultural traditions and cultural relations that partially transcend and partially 
incorporate others—including others that may be more particular and others that may be 
comparably general. It refuses the notion that the cosmopolitan is somehow above or 
outside the particularities of culture, though he or she may participate in cultural 
productivity and sharing that recognizes each cultural tradition only in the context of 
others and thus in partially relativized form.  
 The third and fourth versions of cosmopolitanism are different from each other, 
thus, but even more distinct from the first and second. The third and fourth each seem to 
me to escape much of the criticism I shall pose with regard to the first two, and especially 
the liberal universalism I have used Nussbaum to represent. They may be guilty of 
similar elitism—though I think not as extreme—but they are not rationalist, universalist 
or individualist in the same way. At the same time, they share some important virtues. All 
four sorts of cosmopolitan theories appropriately recognize that the factors shaping 
human lives are not contained within discrete societies. All four approach existing 
cultures and communities with recognition that these are internally complex, that 
members struggle with each other, interpret common heritage differently, and take 
different positions on cultural norms that are in tension with each other. Though this is 
recognized most by the second (e.g. Held) and fourth (e.g. Pollack), all recognize in some 
degree the extent to which memberships are typically multiple and overlapping. People 
do not cease to live in Birmingham and Britain because they are of Pakistani origin, 
Muslim faith, and perhaps Sindi ethnicity.  
                                                 
7 See Sennett (1970) on the ways in which growing up amid complex heterogeneity made nurture stronger 
individuality than protection from diversity in suburbs or other such spaces. A similar insight informs 
Georg Simmel’s (1950) classic account of “The Metropolis and Mental Life”. 
 As a result of the last, all point up one of the great weaknesses of much 
communitarian thought. This is the tendency to treat communities as though they were 
individuals. Some kinds of advocacy for multiculturalism treat cultures as similarly 
integral. This is commonly diagnosed in nationalist thought. The US pledge of allegiance, 
for example, repeats a claim common to many nationalisms in referring to the 
“indivisible” character of the nation. Advocates for ethnic communities and other 
“identity groups” too often speak as though all members of a group might share the same 
interests and indeed be much more identical to each other than they are—and as though 
there were much more agreement about both interests and identity than there is. It is this 
sort of simplification that motivates arguments against “identity” such as that of Brubaker 
and Cooper (2000). And likewise communitarians often slip into speaking of the 
community, or the culture of a community as though either could be more unitary and 
clearly bounded than is possible. This sort of slip among communitarians provides 
cosmopolitans with a convenient straw man to knock down. But that culture and 
community are never quite so simple does not mean that they lack force or legitimate 
value, let alone that they are mere illusions.   
One way of distinguishing the four versions of cosmopolitanism is to consider 
how each approaches the idea of citizenship. Extreme ethical cosmopolitanism asserts 
that citizenship of the world is direct and unmediated—it is an inherent attribute of 
humanness—and is fundamental and unqualified. Moderate political cosmopolitanism 
(especially in the “cosmopolitan democracy” version of Held) values citizenship of the 
world, but also citizenship in a variety of intermediate associations of different kinds, 
including corporations and other institutions as well as territorially based populations; it 
sees world citizenship as at least in part mediated through these other forms of 
association. The cosmopolitanism Sennett associates with urban life is also linked to an 
idea of citizenship. Not only is there a strong tradition of locating citizenship in cities 
(rather than nations), but there is an ideal of citizenship focused on the virtue of citizens 
rather than their belonging to any group. The city is a place in which the virtue of good 
citizenship can be acquired and displayed, in part because the loyalty of an urban citizen 
to a city is not to the category of people who happen to be there but to the place and the 
life it supports. Finally, however, the critical cosmopolitanism suggested by Pollock and 
his colleagues questions whether the notion of citizenship is “a necessary common frame 
to be shared universally,” and worries that exalting the ideal of citizen typically depends 
on certain notions of public life (and restriction of intimacy to the private sphere), and on 
the idea of the individual—and especially autonomous interest-bearing individuals—as 
the subjects of citizenship (Pollock et al, 2000: 584).  
Indeed, they suggest that while focusing on rights has been important in many 
contexts, “the fetishization of liberal individualism has, in the past few years, created a 
cosmopolitan imaginary signified by the icons of singular personhood” (Pollock et al 
581). Advocates for global issues from AIDS to land mines, business leaders with global 
visions and power, philanthropists working internationally, and public figures 
communicating to audiences around the world (whether on politics or simply as 
entertainment) thus figure as icons for cosmopolitanism. But individualism is just part of 
what this reveals. It also suggests how much the “imaginary” behind cosmopolitan social 
theory is rooted in the way elites participate in globalization. It is accordingly somewhat 
skewed.  
I have elsewhere (Calhoun 2003) referred to this as “the class consciousness of 
frequent travelers.” I mean to call attention not just to the elite occupational status of 
those who form the archetypal image of the cosmopolitans, but to the grounding certain 
material privileges give to the intellectual position. “Good” passports and easy access to 
visa, international credit cards and membership in airline clubs, invitations from 
conference organizers and organizational contacts all facilitate a kind of inhabitation (if 
not necessarily citizenship) of the world as an apparent whole. To be sure, diasporas 
provide for other circuits of international connectivity, drawing on ethnic and kin 
connections rather than the more bureaucratically formalized ones of businesspeople, 
academics, and aid workers. But the point is not simply privilege. It is that a sense of 
connection to the world as a whole, and of being a competent actor on the scale of 
“global citizenship” is not merely a matter of the absence of more local ties. It has its own 
material and social conditions. Moreover, the cosmopolitan elites are hardly culture-free; 
they do not simply reflect the rational obligations of humanity in the abstract (even if 
their theories try to).  
To some extent, the cosmopolitan elite culture is a product of Western dominance 
and the kinds of intellectual orientations it has produced. It reflects “modernity” which 
has its own historical provenance. To quote Pollock and his colleagues again, “this 
revenant late liberalism reveals, in a more exaggerated form, a struggle at the heart of 
liberal theory, where a genuine desire for equality as a universal norm is tethered to a 
tenacious ethnocentric provincialism in matters of cultural judgment and recognition” 
(Pollock, et al 2000: 581). But the cultural particularity is not simply inheritance, and not 
simply a reflection of (mainly) Western modernity. It is also constructed out of the 
concrete conditions of cosmopolitan mobility, education, and participation in certain 
versions of news and other media flows. It is the culture of those who attend Harvard and 
the LSE, who read The Economist and The New Yorker, who recognize Mozart’s music 
as universal, and who can discuss the relative merits of Australian, French, and Chilean 
wines. It is also a culture in which secularism seems natural and religion odd, and in 
which respect for human rights is assumed but the notion of fundamental economic 
redistribution is radical and controversial. This culture has many good qualities, as well 
as blindspots, but nonetheless it is culture and not its absence.  
Nussbaum and other extreme cosmopolitans, and to a lesser extent many of the 
moderates, present cosmopolitanism first and foremost as a kind of virtuous deracination, 
a liberation from the possibly illegitimate and in any case blinkering attachments of 
locality, ethnicity, religion, and nationality. But like secularism, cosmopolitanism is a 
presence not an absence, an occupation of particular positions in the world, not a view 
from nowhere or everywhere. All actually existing cosmopolitanisms, to be more precise, 
reflect influences of social location and cultural tradition. The ways in which any one 
opens to understanding or valuing of others are specific and never exhaust all the possible 
ways. Secularism is again instructive. The parameters of specific religious traditions 
shape the contours of what is considered not religious, nor not the domain of specific 
religions. The not-specifically-religious, thus, is never a simple embodiment of neutrality. 
What is “secular” in relation to multiple Christian denominations may not be exactly 
equivalent to what is secular in the context of Hindu or Muslim traditions (let alone of 
their intermingling and competition). So too, cosmopolitan transcendence of localism and 
parochialism is not well understood as simple neutrality towards or tolerance of all 
particularisms. It is participation in a particular, if potentially broad, process of cultural 
production and social interconnection that spans boundaries.  
To say that the cosmopolitanism of most theories reflects the experience of 
business, academic, and public sector elites, thus, is not merely to point to some reasons 
why others may not so readily share it but also to suggest sources of its particular 
character. It is a neither freedom from culture nor a matter of pure individual choice, but 
a cultural position constructed on particular social bases and a choice made possible by 
both that culture and those bases. It is accordingly different from the transcendence of 
localism on other cultural and social bases. Cosmopolitanism has particular rather than 
solely universal content, thus, so its advocates sometimes fail to recognize this. 
Moreover, the content and the misrecognition are connected to social bases of relative 
privilege.  
Much thinking about ethnicity and the legitimacy of local or other particularistic 
attachments by self-declared cosmopolitans reflects their tacit presumption of their own 
more or less elite position. I do not mean simply that they act to benefit themselves, or in 
other ways from bad motives. Rather, I mean that their construction of genuine 
benevolence is prejudiced against ethnic and other attachments because of the primacy of 
the perspective of elites. Any prejudice by elites in favor of others in their own ethnic 
groups or communities would amount to favoring the already privileged (a very anti-
Rawlsian position). So the cosmopolitans are keen to rule out such self-benefiting 
particularism. But ethnic solidarity is not always a matter of exclusion by the powerful; it 
is often a resource for effective collective action and mutual support among the less 
powerful. While it is true, in other words, that in-group solidarity by those in positions of 
power and influence usually amounts to discrimination against less powerful or 
privileged others, it is also true that solidarity serves to strengthen the weak. Indeed, 
those who are excluded from or allowed only weak access to dominant structures of 
power and discourse have especially great need to band together in order to be effective.  
In short, when cosmopolitan appeals to humanity as a whole are presented in 
individualistic terms, they are apt to privilege those with the most capacity to get what 
they want by individual action. However well intentioned, they typically devalue the 
ways in which other people depend on ethnic, national, and communal solidarities—
among others—to solve practical problems in their lives. And they typically neglect the 
extent to which asserting that cultural difference should be valued only as a matter of 
individual taste—“identifications”, in Brubaker’s and Cooper’s terms—undermines any 
attempt to redistribute benefits in the social order across culturally defined groups. They 
can extol multiculturalism, in other words, so long as this is defined as a harmonious 
arrangement in all cultures are seen as attractive parts of a mosaic, but not when members 
of one cultural group organize to demand that the mosaic be altered. In the case of 
Hawaii, for example, Jon Okamura has not only challenged the myth of a multicultural 
paradise, but noted the extent to which this enshrines an existing distribution of power 
and resources. It not only encourages the idea that individuals from each cultural group 
should be treated equally (as against, say, affirmative action). It especially inhibits self-
organization by members of any group traditionally on the losing end—say native 
Hawaiians—to alter the terms of the distributive game. Such organization can only 
appear as hostile to the idealized multicultural harmony.   
Ethnicity and the Value of Solidarity 
So far, my argument has been mostly cautionary and critical. I have suggested 
that most cosmopolitan theories are individualistic in ways that obscure the basic 
importance of social relationships and culture. I have argued that reducing the diversity of 
cultural and social identities to different tastes or possible “identifications” inhibits 
attention to the ways in which they are both basic to individual lives and undermines 
recognition of why those on the losing end of processes of globalization (and other social 
arrangements) may have special reasons to understand their place in the world and 
organize their action through such solidarities. I have also suggested quite simply that 
culture and social relationships are as real as individuals, even if they lack bodies. My 
critique has been strongest against the “extreme cosmopolitanism” that promotes 
elimination of all loyalties lesser than that of each individual to humanity as a whole, but 
raises questions also about the “moderate cosmopolitanism” that would recognize at least 
some such loyalties though only in “thin” versions that are compatible with an integrated 
global polity. What I want to do now, in closing and all too briefly, is to say a little about 
social solidarity itself—or more precisely, the forms of social solidarity in which people 
organize their lives,  
A first thing to recall is that no one lives outside particularistic solidarities. Some 
cosmopolitan theorists may believe they do, but this is an illusion made possible by 
positions of relative privilege and the dominant place of some cultural orientations in the 
world at large. The illusion is not a simple mistake, but a misrecognition tied to what 
Pierre Bourdieu called the “illusio” of all social games, the commitment to their structure 
that shapes the engagement of every player and makes possible effective play. In other 
words, cosmopolitans do not simply fail to see the cultural particularity and social 
supports of their cosmopolitanism, but cannot fully and accurately recognize these 
without introducing a tension between themselves and their social world. And here I 
would include myself and probably all of us. Whether we theorize cosmopolitanism or 
not, we are embedded in social fields and practical projects in which we have little choice 
but to make use of some of the notions basic to cosmopolitanism and thereby reproduce 
it. We have the option of being self-critical as we do so, but not of entirely abandoning 
cosmopolitanism because we cannot act effectively without it. Nor should we want to 
abandon it, since it enshrines many important ideas like the equal worth of all human 
beings and—at least potentially—the value of cultural and social diversity. But we should 
want to transform it, not least because as usually constructed, especially in its most 
individualistic forms, it systematically inhibits attention to the range of solidarities on 
which people depend, and to the special role of such solidarities in the struggles of the 
less privileged and those displaced or challenged by capitalist globalization. 
Second, it is important to think of solidarities in the plural, avoiding the illusion 
that plagued much earlier thought of ethnicity and nationalism that there was some one 
basic identity common to all members of a group. Nations and ethnic groups are 
internally differentiated in a variety of ways, overlap with and are cross-cut by various 
other identities, and figure with greater or lesser salience when members are in different 
interpersonal situations and when different large-scale factors—say economic change—
affect their overall positions. Family comes to the fore sometimes, and may push ethnic 
solidarities to the background. Ethnicity may shape a certain interaction more than class 
or class provide the basis for a cross-ethnic solidarity without either of these being clearly 
prior to or more real than the other. Indeed, this is an important reason not to see any of 
these solidarities as entirely “pre-political”. Though they may be bases for political 
action, they are also recurrently remade by political efforts. These efforts include not only 
organizing and material changes but intentionally produced changes in discourse—like 
those wrought by feminism as well as by some ethnic and nationalist movements.  
Third, not only are people shaped by and participants in a variety of different 
solidarities, these are organized in different ways. Without going into any detail, let me 
just evoke six.  
1. Solidarity may be underwritten by mutual interdependence in 
exchange, which may be more or less readily recognized. At a 
micro-level such connections may appear as concrete exchanges, at 
a macro-level they are more likely to seem systems, and to be 
understood without reference to the interpersonal transactions that 
make them up. This is how we think of “the economy” for 
example, but a sense of economic interdependence can be 
powerful. 
2. Solidarity may also be produced by common culture. Speaking the 
same language, having the same referents—goods to think with, in 
Lèvi-Strauss’s sense—even participating in the same habitual 
arguments can all produce a sense of shared belonging. This is 
reinforced by the simple extent to which it is easier to interact 
when more or the “ground rules” are clear from the outset. 
3. Distinct from cultural commonality of the sort mentioned above is 
membership in culturally defined categories. Nations are perhaps 
the most important of these categorical identities in the modern 
world, but class, gender, race, clan, and others work in similar 
ways. Indeed, the very notion of humanity as a whole evoked by 
cosmopolitans is such a categorical identity. It posits a “set” the 
members of which are equivalent in some crucial regard. Ethnicity 
is sometimes understood this way, especially when it is made an 
object of bureaucratic administration or large scale media and 
political attention. More often, though, ethnicity is understood to 
be more than simply a categorical identity; it implies relatively 
dense interpersonal relationships (e.g., marriage within the group).  
4. Structures of social relations—networks—are a fourth form of 
solidarity. Here groupness is less a matter of equivalence among 
members or of a single label that fits all. Rather, it is the product of 
the way in which members are joined to each other in direct or 
indirect relationships. Without going into it very much, direct ones 
are those in which the parties are clearly known to each other as 
persons—mainly but not exclusively face-to-face relationships—
while indirect ones are those in which some sort of mediation is 
involved that makes the connection without direct interaction and 
mutual awareness—as one might by related by marriage or by a 
bureaucratic organization--to people one has never met. 
5. Though not always recognized as such, public communication is 
itself a form of solidarity. It is often presumed that people must be 
already joined in solidarity to form a public, but this seems wrong 
insofar as the very notion of public has to do with communication 
among those who are not bound to each other by private ties. 
Communication may take place among strangers and yet knit its 
participants into a sense of a common undertaking. This is true in 
many social movements—say the anti-globalization or antiwar 
movements--which have enormous scale and mobilize people who 
share no single categorical identity or strong personal network. It is 
also true of the collective discourse of many countries, and is an 
element of national connection distinct from common culture or 
mere categorical membership. 
6. Finally, people are sometimes—too often, in fact—joined to each 
other by material power. They are conquered, drafted into armies, 
enslaved, or evicted from traditional landholdings and organized 
into new settlements. Their connections are neither the product of 
common culture, nor of pre-existing networks, nor of public 
choice, yet people joined to each other by impositions of power do 
form relationships and do develop collective self-understandings 
that shape their lives together and their relations with others. Even 
where we should regard the actions that create these groupings as 
illegitimate, it does not follow that the groupings themselves are.  
The different forms of solidarity may be chosen by and reshaped by their 
participants in different degree. The first and the last appear mainly as impositions of 
material necessity, though perhaps not immutably so. It is hard to imagine individuals 
willfully transforming common culture, but cultures do change as a result of cumulative 
processes and individuals also exercise choice—conscious or unconscious—in their 
acquisition of and participation in culture. They may move to another society and learn 
another language, for example, but more modestly, they may also claim or reject various 
ostensibly common cultural values, delve into and reproduce historical traditions or let 
them fade. Categorical identities are open to choice, though also pressed on people by 
ascription. Social networks are shaped by available choices, proximity, and other 
structural factors but also partly products of choice. And certainly opening possibilities 
for collective choice is one of the most basic virtues of public communication. 
A central point here is that we do not need to chose between two caricatures of 
social solidarity, identity, ethnicity, or more generally groupness. It is not either simply a 
matter of inheritance and essential commonality or a matter of free-flowing ubiquitous 
and undetermined construction. It is socially produced, shaped by material factors, 
culturally organized and yet also open to human action.  
Solidarity, thus, is not the “bad other” to individual choice. Not only may it be 
chosen, it may be a crucial condition of other choices. And absence of solidarity may 
eliminate possibilities for choice. Solidarity may, for example, be the basis of an effort to 
restrict allegedly “free” market relations—for example by limiting the right of 
“outsiders” to buy land held by members of “local” groups. Absent restrictions, the 
apparently greater net freedom of choice—all the world is free to buy—becomes a radical 
loss of freedom to the locals (especially where these are less wealthy than most 
outsiders). That restrictions appear at first blush to be clearly reductions in freedom is an 
expression of the extent to which a certain liberal ideology is dominant and also the 
extent to which most of us are in positions of relative privilege and so can readily 
imagine ourselves primarily as buyers. But an approach to the world in which 
cosmopolitan diversity simply opens a greater range of consumer options is clearly a 
limited one. And, as evoking this suggests, buying into some neoliberal discourses about 
freedom actually means celebrating the tyranny of the market.  
I do not mean to accuse Nussbaum or other strong cosmopolitans of neoliberalism 
or celebrations of consumerism. I do mean to suggest that inattention to social solidarity 
may make for slippage between cosmopolitanism based on strong ethical universalism 
and that based on misrecognized personal advantage. It is important not to sacrifice 
sociological analysis of why people seek and reproduce social solidarity to a more or less 
abstract account of individuals, states, and humanity at large. And it is important not to 
think that valuing humanity as a whole eliminates—even potentially—the need for 
valuing various more intermediary solidarities.  
Cosmopolitanism is not wrong, but by itself it is inadequate. Taking seriously the 
whole of humanity need not preclude taking seriously the various particular relationships 
in which humans are constituted and connected to each other. Cosmopolitanism remains 
attractive, and arguments linked to it have offered important insights in political theory. 
But it needs the complement of greater attention to social solidarities.  
Cosmopolitanism need not be abandoned in order to take community, culture, and 
other forms of solidarity seriously. On the contrary, it may be improved. 
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